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Immoral Because They're Bad, Bad Because
They're Wrong: Sexual Orientation and
Presumptions of Parental Unfitness
in Custody Disputes
Of all the cases which involve gay issues, those involving the
custody of children of gay parents are the most numerous.1 Al-
though the number of child custody cases that have been deter-
mined on the basis of sexual orientation of the parent is not
known, because most never go beyond the trial level, the number
of published appellate cases have been numerous enough to clearly
illustrate the reluctance of the courts to give custody to a gay par-
ent.2 Thus, gay parents are frequently denied primary custody and
allowed visitation only under restricted guidelines a Oscar Wilde,
nineteenth century poet and playwright, expressed the pain felt
when a child is taken from a parent by the courts when he wrote,
while imprisoned for sodomy, that he could bear all else except
that "my two children are taken from me by legal procedure.
That is and always will remain to me a source of infinite distress,
of infinite pain. . . . [T]he disgrace of prison is as nothing com-
pared with it."'
4
Case and statutory law virtually always require courts to base
custody decisions on the best interest of the child. What is in the
child's best interests is frequently determined by an examination
of the fitness of each parent.6 The question then raised is to what
extent homosexuality may enter into this determination of fitness.
7
In evaluating the fitness of a homosexual parent, courts have
adopted three approaches. The first approach, called the per se
approach, activates a "rebuttable" presumption that the gay par-
ent is unfit? Thus, regardless of other factors involved, the fact of
1. Note, Queer Law, I 1 U. DAYTON L. REv. 327 (1986).
2. Id. at 329. Virtually all of the cases cited in this Comment will involve custody;
especially those found in Part If(A) & (B) illustrate this point. See generally Note, An
Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications
Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. at 812-21 (1985).
3. See Part II(A) & (B) of this Comment.
4. Beargie, Custody Determinations Involving the Homosexual Parent, 22 FAm. L.
Q. 71 (1988) (quoting O. WILDE, DE PROFUNDIS 34 (R. Ross ed., 1909)).
5. Virtually any child custody case or periodical regarding custody makes clear that
custody is to be based on the "best interests of the child."
6. Beargie, supra note 4, at 72.
7. Id.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 98-113.
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homosexuality alone is used to deny custody to the gay parent.9
The next approach, frequently referred to as the middle ground
approach, does not presume that the gay parent is per se unfit, but
relies on the presumption that a child will be harmed by exposure
to the gay parent's homosexuality. 10 Thus, the court will require
the gay parent to forgo sexual activity with members of the same
sex, separate from a same-sex partner, or follow other restrictive
behavioral guidelines.' Finally, under the nexus approach, the
court requires proof that the parent's homosexuality has or will
adversely affect the child before custody can be denied. 2 Only in
this approach does the court rely on the evidence, rather than on
presumption, to determine the parental capabilities of each
parent.
13
The presumptions of the gay parent's unfitness used in the per
se and middle ground approach are usually supported by the fol-
lowing rationales. First, courts believe that the child's morality
will be adversely affected by exposure to the parent's homosexual-
ity.14 Second, courts fear that the child will be forced to absorb
oppression, harassment and stigmatization caused by society's
negative view of homosexuality.' 5 Third, state sodomy statutes
forbid by definition many forms of homosexual sex; consequently,
many practicing homosexuals are engaging in criminal behavior. 6
The court then reasons that homosexuals, as criminals, are unfit
parents.' 7 Fourth, courts fear that exposing the child to the gay
parent's homosexuality might cause the child to be sexually disori-
ented.18 Finally, courts fear that the child might contract AIDS
from the gay parent. 9
If homosexuals were treated as a quasi-suspect class, would the
five interests of the state mentioned above, which support the pre-
sumptions of the gay parent's unfitness, be considered important
enough to withstand intermediate scrutiny? In other words, could
presumptions of unfitness still be used against the gay parent in
child custody cases? The Supreme Court has stipulated that if a
9. Id.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 114-22.
!1. Id.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 123-32.
13. Id.
14. See Infra text accompanying notes 139-57.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 158-75.
16. State sodomy statutes forbid contact between the genitals of one person and the
mouth or anus of another. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), and infra text
accompanying notes 176-82.
17. Id.
18, See infra text accompanying notes 183-88.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 189-91.
[Vol. 26
2
California Western Law Review, Vol. 26 [1989], No. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol26/iss2/7
CUSTODY DISPUTES
law classifies on the basis of a quasi-suspect class under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, it must serve an
important governmental interest and must be substantially related
to the achievement of that interest in order to pass intermediate
scrutiny. 0 In Part I of this Comment, an argument for classifying
homosexuals as a quasi-suspect class entitled to intermediate scru-
tiny is examined. That examination shows that gay men and lesbi-
ans meet the criteria necessary for a quasi-suspect class. Part II
examines the approaches courts use to deal with child custody dis-
putes involving gay parents, and how the presumptions of the gay
parent's unfitness found in two of these approaches might be af-
fected were they forced to withstand intermediate scrutiny. This
Part reveals that if gays were classified as a quasi-suspect class,
presumptions of unfitness could no longer be used to deny custody
to the gay parent. Part III examines the interests purportedly
served by the state in order to support these presumptions of unfit-
ness, and whether these interests would be insufficient to deny cus-
tody to the gay parent, if gays were classified as a quasi-suspect
class.
I. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY FOR HOMOSEXUALS
The Supreme Court applies one of three levels of scrutiny to
legislative classifications challenged under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment: rational relationship, inter-
mediate, and strict. Part A of this section discusses the standard
of review for rational relationship and strict scrutiny, and when
these levels of scrutiny are typically applied. Part B of this section
discusses the standard of review for inermediate scrutiny, and the
four criteria necessary to form a quasi-suspect class. Part B ar-
gues that gays meet the four criteria and should, therefore, be
classified as a quasi-suspect class entitled to intermediate scrutiny.
A. Rational Relationship and Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court usually applies only minimum scrutiny to
legislative classifications challenged under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.21 The Court has held that
under minimum scrutiny, a state law must be only rationally re-
20. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Mills v. Habluetzel. 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982);
Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 440 (1981). See generally Note, Quasi-Suspect
Classes and Proof of Discriminatory Intent: A New Model 90 YALE L.J. 912 (1981).
21. McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). See Note, An Argument for the Application of
Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. at 808-09.
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lated to a legitimate state interest.22 In nearly every case in which
the rational relationship test is used, the Court has upheld the
challenged law.23
The Court will depart from the rational relationship test and
use a heightened level of scrutiny under equal protection if a chal-
lenged law classified based on a quasi-suspect 24 or suspect 25 class.
The criteria necessary to trigger the use of heightened scrutiny is
basically the same for both quasi-suspect and suspect classes.
23
The primary difference between the two classes is the standard of
review which a law must undergo in order to be upheld.
Under strict scrutiny, a law which contains a classification
based on a suspect class must be substantially related to a compel-
ling governmental interest.2 7 The Court restricts the suspect clas-
sification primarily to race and national origin.28 The challenged
law is almost always invalidated when strict scrutiny is imposed.2 9
The standard of review for intermediate scrutiny, which is used
for laws which contain a classification based on a quasi-suspect
class, is analyzed in the following section, as well as the criteria
necessary to signal the use of a quasi-suspect classification.
B. Intermediate Scrutiny
The Supreme Court applies intermediate scrutiny to classifica-
tions which involve a quasi-suspect class."0 When a law classifies
based on a quasi-suspect class, the law must serve an important
governmental interest and must be substantially related to the
achievement of that interest.31 The classifications to which the
court has applied intermediate scrutiny are primarily restricted to
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Note, Quasi-Suspect Classes, supra note 20; Craig v. Borin, 429 U.S. 190,
97 S. Ct. 451, 51 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1976).
25. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.. 1, 10 (1967); See Note, Equal Protection, supra note 21.
26. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 441, 105 S. Ct. 3255;
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313, 96 S. Ct. 2563, 2566-67,
49 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 at 684-85, 93 S. Ct. 1764,
1769, 36 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1973). See Part I(B) of this Comment for a discussion of the four
criteria.
27. See supra note 25.
28. See supra note 25.
29. The only exception is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) ("the
Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications . . . be subjected to the most
rigid scrutiny.")
30. The criteria necessary to form a quasi-suspect class are discussed in Part I(B) of
this Comment. These criteria explain why a class needs the extra protection given in inter-
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gender, 32 illegitimacy,33 and alienage.34
The Supreme Court has stated four criteria which determine
the use of heightened scrutiny for a particular classification. As
mentioned previously, the criteria which a class must have in or-
der to signal the use of heightened scrutiny are basically the same
for both quasi-suspect and suspect classes. 5 First, members of the
class must possess an immutable trait that is due to factors be-
yond the individuars control.3 Second, the class must be labeled
with incorrect stereotypes.3 7 Third, the class must have exper-
ienced a history of discrimination. 8 Finally, the class must be a
politically powerless minority. 9
The Supreme court has never decided whether homosexuals
meet the above criteria and should, therefore, be classified as a
protected class. Federal courts, however, have decided the issue in
directly conflicting ways. Gays were not classified as a quasi-sus-
pect or suspect class in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh. 0 There, a U.S.
Army Reserve sergeant was barred from reenlistment on grounds
that she was an admitted homosexual. 4' She brought an action
against the Army alleging that its regulations making the status
of homosexuality a nonwaivable disqualification for service re-
gardless of conduct violated, among other things, her constitu-
tional right to equal protection. The court stated that "[i] f homo-
sexual conduct may be criminalized, (such as it was in Bowers v.
Hardwick), then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-
suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for
equal protection purposes.""2 The court upheld the Army's regula-
tion against enlistment of homosexuals because the regulation was
rationally related to the government's interest in avoiding the risk
that "accepting admitted homosexuals into the armed forces
might imperil morale, discipline, and the effectiveness of our fight-
ing forces."' 3
In 1987, the U.S. District Court for the Ninth District in Cali-
fornia held that gay people are a quasi-suspect class entitled to
32. Reed v. Reed, 202 U.S. 71 (1971).
33. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982).
34. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 322, 440 (1981).
35. See supra note 26.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 57-64.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 65-75.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 76-84.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 85-95.
40. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (1989).
41. Id. at 464.
42. Id. at 464. For a discussion of the facts of Bowers, supra note 16, see infra text
accompanying notes 176-82.
43. Id. at 461.
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heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause in High
Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office.44
There, a nationwide class action was brought challenging the De-
partment of Defense's policy of subjecting lesbian and gay appli-
cants for secret security clearances to expanded investigations and
mandatory adjudications because they were lesbian or gay.45 The
Department of Defense stated that it was necessary to subject les-
bians and gay men to expanded investigations and mandatory ad-
judications because homosexuality "indicates a personality disor-
der or could result in exposing the individual to . . . blackmail or
coercion. "46 The court held that the Department of Defense's ar-
guments were without merit.47 The court stated that homosexual-
ity did not indicate a personality disorder since "the uncontro-
verted consensus of the American professional psychological
community has been that homosexual orientation itself is not a
psychological problem. ' 48 Further, defendants produced no evi-
dence on the record that lesbians and gay men were subject to
blackmail.4 9 Because the expanded investigations and mandatory
adjudications in this case were not substantially related to an im-
portant state interest, the court held they were unconstitutional. 50
In Watkins v. United States Army, a soldier challenged the
constitutionality of army regulations barring homosexuals from
military service regardless of their rank or position.51 There, the
court classified homosexuals as a suspect class. 52 Thus, the Army's
regulations, which classified on the basis of sexual orientation,
were subjected to strict scrutiny.53 The Army used the same argu-
ments as those found in Ben-Shalom: mainly, that homosexuals
might disrupt the morale and discipline of the armed services.54
The court stated that the defendants offered no evidence to sup-
port their argument. 5 Thus, the court, using a strict standard of
review, held that the regulations violated the soldier's equal pro-
tection guarantee because they were not substantially related to a
compelling governmental interest.56
44. High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp.
1368 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
45. Id. at 1361.
46. Id. at 1364.
47. Id. at 1374.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1368.
51. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988).
52. Id. at 1349.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1350.
55, Id. at 1352-53.
56. Id. at 1352. In Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989), the court
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The remainder of Part I will examine the four criteria necessary
to form a quasi-suspect class and whether homosexuals meet each
criterion. (As noted previously, the Supreme Court has never de-
cided whether homosexuals meet the criteria necessary to form a
quasi-suspect class.) The treatment of laws which classify on the
basis of sexual orientation differ from circuit to circuit because
federal courts have decided the issue in directly conflicting ways.
Because the court has reserved strict scrutiny to race and national
origin, and given the current conservative majority of the Supreme
Court, only an argument for a quasi-suspect classification for
homosexuals will be examined. This examination will reveal that
gays meet the criteria necessary to form a quasi-suspect class;
thus, laws which classify on the basis of sexual orientation should
be forced to undergo intermediate scrutiny.
1. Homosexuality Is Immutable and Unchangeable
In gender and illegitimacy cases where intermediate scrutiny is
used, the Supreme Court has stressed that the trait which charac-
terizes the classification must be immutable and determined by
causes not within the individual's control. 7 Courts have held that
race, national origin, alienage, illegitimacy, and gender are immu-
table." Can homosexuality be compared to those classes already
classified as holding immutable traits? Justice Norris in Watkins
makes the following argument:5 9
Although the Supreme Court considered immutability relevant,
it is clear that by immutability the Court has never meant strict
immutability in the sense that members of the class must be
physically unable to change or ma~k the trait defining their
class. People can have operations to change their sex. Aliens can
ordinarily become naturalized citizens. The status of illegitimate
children can be changed. People can frequently hide their na-
tional origin by changing their customs, their names, or their
associations. Lighter skinned blacks can sometimes 'pass' for
whites . . . [or] even change their racial appearance with pig-
ment injections. At a minimum, then, the Supreme Court is
willing to treat a trait as effectively immutable if changing it
would involve great difficulty, such as requiring a major physical
change or a traumatic change in identity. . . . [I]mmutability
may describe those traits that are so central to a person's iden-
held in an en banc rehearing that the Army was estopped from barring Watkins' reenlist-
ment solely because of his acknowledged homosexuality and that it was, therefore, unneces-
sary to reach the constitutional issues raised in the court's previous decision.
57. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 686 (1973); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976).
58. See generally Parham, supra note 57, at 347.
59. Watkins, supra note 51, at 1347.
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tity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a per-
son for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy that
change might be physically.
We have no trouble concluding that sexual orientation is immu-
table for the purposes of equal protection doctrine. Although the
causes of homosexuality are not fully understood, scientific re-
search indicates that we have little control over our sexual orien-
tation and that, once acquired, our sexual orientation is largely
impervious to change. [A]llowing the government to penalize the
failure to change such a central aspect of individual and group
identity would be abhorrent to the values animating the consti-
tutional ideal of equal protection of the laws.60
Another court, however, believes that homosexuality is more or
less a choice, rather than an immutable and unchangeable trait. A
1988 Tennessee appellate court case states that young people form
their sexual identity partly on the basis of models they see in soci-
ety.6" The court believed that if homosexual behavior is legalized,
an adolescent might question whether he or she should "choose"
heterosexuality. 62 In other words, if homosexuality were legalized,
adolescents might choose homosexuality, rather than "traditional
heterosexual family relationships.
63
Despite the belief held by this court that homosexuality is a
choice, there is a general consensus among sexual scientists and
psychotherapists that sexual orientation, like gender and illegiti-
macy, is immutable and unchangeable, and beyond an individual's
control.64 Thus, homosexuals meet this criterion of a quasi-suspect
class.
2. Gays are the Target of Incorrect Stereotypes
Additionally, the Supreme Court demands that a given classifi-
cation not be based on a mistaken premise which unfairly discrim-
inates against a class.6 5 The Court, in its analysis, considers
whether the class has "been subjected to unique disability on the
basis of stereotyped characteristics nct truly indicative of their
abilities." 6 Put another way, the Court asks whether the disad-
vantaged class is defined by a trait that "frequently bears no rela-
60. Id.
61. Collins v. Collins, WL 30173 (Tenn. App. 1988) (Tomlin, J., concurring).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See generally A. BELL, M. WEINBERG & S. HAMERSMITH, SEXUAL PREFERENCE.
hTs DEVELOPMENT IN MEN AND WOMEN (1981) and studies cited therein; see generally
Note, Equal Protection, supra note 21.
65. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 625-26 (1982); Frontiero,
supra note 57, at 686.
66. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
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tion to ability to perform or contribute to society."67 As acknowl-
edged in Watkins, "[s]exual orientation plainly has no relevance
to a person's ability to perform or contribute to society. This irrel-
evance of sexual orientation to the quality of a person's contribu-
tion to society . . . suggests that classifications based on sexual
orientation reflect prejudice and inaccurate stereotypes ... .
This point was particularly obvious in Watkins, since repeated
evaluations by Watkins' superiors stated that Watkins was an ex-
emplary soldier.6 9
The court in High Tech Gays stated the following:
Wholly unfounded, degrading stereotypes about lesbians and
gay men abound in American society. Examples of such stereo-
types include that gay people desire and attempt to molest
young children, that gay people attempt to recruit and convert
other people, and that gay people inevitably engage in promiscu-
ous sexual activity. Many people erroneously believe that the
sexual experience of lesbians and gay men represents the gratifi-
cation of purely prurient interests, not the expression of mutual
affection and love. They fail to recognize that gay people seek
and engage in stable, monogamous relationships. Instead, to
many, the very existence of lesbians and gay men is inimical to
the family. For years, many people have branded gay people as
abominations to nature and considered lesbians and gay men
mentally ill and psychologically unstable. The stereotypes have
no basis in reality and represent outmoded notions about homo-
sexuality, analogous to the 'outmoded notions' of the relative ca-
pabilities of the sexes that require heightened scrutiny of classi-
fications based on gender.
7
1
Further, the court stated that gay men and lesbians are not "en-
emies of American culture and values, [but] occupy positions in
all walks of American life, participate in diverse aspects of family
life, and contribute enormously to many elements of American
culture."
'71
Another stereotype frequently attached to homosexuals is that
all homosexuals live a so-called "gay lifestyle".72 As the dissent
stated in The Matter of the Adoption of Charles B., "all adult
male homosexuals do not pursue a 'gay-lifestyle' any more than
all adult male heterosexuals pursue a 'swingers-lifestyle'. ' 73 The
67. Frontiero, supra note 57, at 686.
68. Watkins, supra note 51, at 1346.
69. See generally Watkins, supra note 51.
70. High Tech Gays, supra note 44, at 1369.
71. Id. at 1370.
72. A gay lifestyle is typically thought of as including promiscuous sexual activity.
See High Tech Gays, supra note 44, at 1369. See also The Matter of the Adoption of
Charles B., WL 119937 (Ohio App. 1988).
73. The Matter of the Adoption of Charles B., WL 119937 (Ohio App. 1988).
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court stated that courts should focus on whether an unmarried
adult lives a gay or swinger lifestyle, and whether that lifestyle is
practiced in such a manner so as to be a detriment to or against
the best interests of the child.74
Because homosexuals have "been subjected to unique disabili-
ties on the basis of characteristics not truly indicative of their
abilities," they fulfill this criterion for a classification as a quasi-
suspect class.75 Because stereotypes of homosexuals are consist-
ently negative, courts which use stereotypes to determine a gay
parent's fitness will inevitably deny custody to the gay parent. Us-
ing stereotypes to generalize about homosexuals sidesteps the need
to look at each person as an individual, helps to perpetuate dis-
crimination against them, and furthers their stigmatization.
3. Gays Have Faced a History of Discrimination and
Stigmatization
Intermediate scrutiny has also been used to protect those classes
which have suffered from a history of purposeful and unfair dis-
crimination.7" For example, discrimination and stigmatization
have historically been a part of the lives of American blacks. 77
Heightened scrutiny both compensates for the past discrimination
suffered by blacks, and helps to curb the persistent prejudice that
exists against them today.78 Like blacks, "[1]esbians and gays
have been the object of some of the deepest prejudice and hatred
in American society. '7' Gays are frequently victims of violence
and have been excluded from jobs, schools, housing, churches, and
even families.80
In High Tech Gays, the court stated that "[s]ome people's ha-
tred for gay people is so deep that many gay people face the
threat of physical violence on American streets today."'" Justice
Brennan, in his dissent from the Supreme Court's denial of certio-
rari in Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, concluded
that "homosexuals have historically been the object of pernicious
and sustained hostility, and it is fair to say that discrimination
against homosexuals is likely to reflect deep-seated prejudice
74. Id.
75. Massachusetts, supra note 66.
76. See supra note 26.
77. Strauder v. West Va., 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
78. Id.
79. High Tech Gays, supra note 44, at 1361.
80. Watkins, supra note 51, at 1329 (citing Note, An Argument for the Application
of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57
S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 824-25 (1984)).
81. High Tech Gays, supra note 44, at 1361.
[Vol. 26
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The government sanctions discrimination through laws which
purposefully and unfairly discriminate against gays. Sodomy stat-
utes, as applied to homosexuals, were upheld as constitutional in
Bowers v. Hardwick.83 By prohibiting sodomy, the statutes are
prohibiting many types of sexual practices in which gays engage.
Thus, sodomy status is used to support and justify numerous other
laws and policies which discriminate against gay people. s4
4. Gays are a Politically Powerless Minority
The Supreme Court has required that laws undergo intermedi-
ate scrutiny when they classify on the basis of a class which the
court considers to be a discrete and insular minority. 5 The Court
looks to whether the group has been "relegated to such a position
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process.""6
The pervasive discrimination against gays has seriously im-
paired their ability to gain a political voice for their views in state
and local legislatures and in Congress. 7 Gays attempting to form
associations to represent their political and social beliefs, free
from destructive reprisals in jobs or other social activities as a re-
sult of their sexual orientation, are the type of discrete and insular
minority that deserve the protection of intermediate scrutiny. 8
The pressure to conceal one's homosexuality commonly deters
gays from openly advocating pro-gay legislation, thus intensifying
their inability to make effective use of the political process.8 9 Be-
cause of the immediate and severe opprobrium often manifested
against gays once their homosexuality is made public, gays are
particularly powerless to pursue their rights openly in the political
arena.9
0
82. 470 U.S. 1009, 105 S. Ct. 1373, 84 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1985).
83. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
84. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1128 (N.D. Tex. 1982); In Re Longstaff, 538
F. Supp. 589, 591-92 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (government relied upon petitioner's alleged viola-
tion of Texas sodomy statute as a basis for exclusion); Board of Education v. Calderon, 35
Cal. App. 3d 490, 496, 110 Cal. Rptr. 916, 919 (1973); Moser v. State Bd. of Educ., 22
Cal. App. 3d 988, 989, 101 Cal. Rptr. 86, 87 (1972); see generally Note, Queer Law,
supra note 1.
85. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) Examining Board v.
Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602, 96 S. Ct. 2264, 2281, 49 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1976); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
86. San Antonio, supra note 85.
87. High Tech Gays, supra note 44, at 1370.
88. High Tech Gays, supra note 44, at 1370 (quoting Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace,
570 F. Supp. 202, 209 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1983)).
89. Watkins, supra note 51, at 1348.
90. Watkins, supra note 51, at 1348 (Brennan, J., dissenting denial of cert.) (quoting
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Even if gays do overcome prejudice enough to participate
openly in politics, the general animus towards homosexuality may
render this participation wholly ineffective, because elected offi-
cials sensitive to public prejudice may refuse to support pro-gay
legislation.9 1 These barriers to political power are underscored by
the underrepresentation of avowed homosexuals in government.92
Another court, however, believes differently. In Ben-Shalom,
the court stated that "[iln these times homosexuals are proving
that they are not without growing political power. It cannot be
said 'they have no ability to attract the attention of the
lawmakers.' A political approach is open to them to seek [congres-
sional representation]."" Thus, the court rejected the idea that
gays met the criteria of a quasi-suspect class.94
The stereotypes and prejudice attached to gays affect the minds
of lawmakers as well as those of the general population. Because
of this stereotyping and prejudice, gays are assured of receiving
little representation in government, as illustrated by the persistent
official discrimination described above. Despite lobbying and other
political efforts of various gay organizations, legal discrimination
in all areas continues to be a part of gay life.95
Part I has examined the four criteria the Supreme Court has
held are necessary to form a quasi-suspect class. Because homo-
sexuals meet these criteria, they should be given the status of
quasi-suspect class.9 6 Thus, laws which classify on the basis of sex-
ual orientation should be subjected to equal protection intermedi-
ate scrutiny in order to withstand a constitutional challenge. Inter-
mediate scrutiny demands that laws which classify on the basis of
quasi-suspect class must serve an important governmental interest
and must be substantially related to the achievement of that inter-
est.17 The rational relationships standard, typically used by courts
to determine whether laws which classify on the basis of sexual
orientation should be upheld, has been insufficient to strike down
laws which unfairly discriminate against gays. Intermediate scru-
tiny would require courts to analyze more carefully laws which
Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S. at 1014, 105 S. Ct. at 1377).
91. Watkins, supra note 51, at 1348 (citing Note, The Constitutional Status of Sex-
ual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification; 98 HARV. L. REV. 1248,
1304).
92. Watkins, supra note 51, at 1349.
93. Ben-Shalom, supra note 40, at 466.
94. Id.
95. Watkins, supra note 51, at 1349; Ben-Shalom, supra note 40, at 466.
96. Because the criteria which a class must have in order to signal the use of height-
ened scrutiny is basically the same for both quasi-suspect and suspect classes, gays would
meet the criteria for suspect classes as well. See supra note 26.
97. See generally Note, Quasi-Suspect Classes, supra note 24.
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CUSTODY DISPUTES
classify on the basis of sexual orientation, and would, therefore,
reveal the unfairness of these laws.
Part II will now examine the three approaches used in child
custody disputes involving a gay parent, and how the presump-
tions of a gay parent's unfitness used in the per se and middle
ground approaches could be dissolved under equal protection chal-
lenges if subjected to intermediate scrutiny, instead of the cur-
rently-used rational relationship standard.
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES IN CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES
INVOLVING A GAY PARENT
In determining the fitness of a homosexual parent, courts have
used three approaches: the per se approach, the middle ground
approach and the nexus approach. This section defines these ap-
proaches, reveals the effects of their use, and analyzes how each
would fare under equal protection intermediate scrutiny.
A. The Per Se Approach
The approach which generally results in the denial of custody to
the gay parent is the per se approach. 8 Under this approach, the
parent's homosexuality presents a rebuttable presumption that the
parent is unfit. 9 Because the best interests of the child lisually
rest on the fitness of the parent, the gay parent can be refused
custody without any evidence of an actual adverse effect on the
child.' 00 From the outset, the per se approach presents the gay
parent with the nearly impossible challenge of disproving his or
her unfitness. 0 1 Here, it is both the status of being a homosexual
and the homosexual conduct of the gay parent upon which the
court frowns. Punishment through the denial of custody for the
mere status of being homosexual is unique to the per se approach.
A typical case using the per se approach is T.C.H. v.K.M.H. 1 2
There, the Missouri Court of Appeal granted custody of the
couple's two children to the father, rather than to the lesbian
mother. The children expressed a desire to live with their mother.
The court acknowledged that the psychologists and social workers
testified that the mother would be a better custodian. However,
the court stated that the mother might adversely affect her chil-
98. G.A. v. D.A., 7455 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. App. 1987); T.C.H. v. K.M.H., WL
155353 (Mo. App. 1989). See infra text accompanying notes 99-113.
99. See supra note 98. See Beargie, Custody Determinations Involving the Homo-
sexual Parent, 22 FAI. L.Q. 71 (1988).
100. See generally supra note 98.
101. Id.
102. WL 155353 (Mo. App. 1989).
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dren's morality, basing that argument solely on the fact that the
mother was a lesbian.10 3 The court noted that the mother had lied
about her relationship with her lesbian lover in depositions, and at
other times. 10 4 The court concluded that the mother's lies were
evidence of poor moral standards. 105 However, once the mother
told the truth about her lesbianism, the court used that as evi-
dence of poor moral standards.10 6
Another recent case illustrates how strong and nearly irrebut-
table this presumption of unfitness is. In G.A. v. D.A., the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals granted custody of the couple's only son to
the father, rather than the lesbian mother, based solely on the
mother's lesbianism. 10 7 The court stated that because the mother
lived with her lesbian lover, and because there was no mention by
the mother of any religious training that she would make available
to her child, the environment in which the child would be raised
would be unhealthy and harmful to the child's moral
development.108
Justice Lowenstein, in his dissenting opinion, argued against the
presumptions of unfitness used by the court against gay parents.
He stated that:
[a]ny doubt as to the irrebuttable or conclusive presumption
based on what 'may' . . . result from a child in the custody of a
homosexual parent, would . . . be here dispelled by an affirm-
ance based on these facts. The mother provides the child with
his own room in a well kept house, enrolls him in a pre-school,
has a steady nursing job, [and] cares about the child. . . . The
father has limited education, an income of $6,500 [annually]
and lives in . . . a one room cabin containing a toilet surrounded
by a curtain; the child sleeps in a foldup cot by a woodstove and
plays in an area littered with Busch beer cans, collected by the
father's 'slow' sister. . . . To say it is in the best interests of this
little boy to put him in the sole custody of the father, who was
pictured leering at a girly magazine, solely on the basis of the
mother's sexual preference, would be and is a mistake."0 9
As the above cases illustrate, presuming that the gay parent is
unfit, especially when faced with evidence to the contrary, may
frequently leave the child in the hands of a less-fit parent or third
party. If homosexuals were classified as a quasi-suspect class, then





107. 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. App. 1987).
108. Id. at 727.
109. Id. at 729.
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termediate scrutiny requires that laws serve an important govern-
mental objective and be substantially related to achieving that ob-
jective.110 The Court would unquestionably find that protecting
the best interests of the child is an important governmental objec-
tive. However, the means used under the per se approach are not
substantially related to achieving that objective. The courts' pre-
sumptions sidestep the need for factual analysis of the parties' pa-
rental capabilities and of the particular needs of the child. Thus,
some fit parents are inevitably deprived of custody while some un-
fit parents or third parties are granted custody. This runs counter
to the child's best interests. Therefore, because the means are not
substantially related to achieving the important governmental ob-
jective of protecting the best interests of the child, the per se ap-
proach would fail a constitutional challenge utilizing intermediate
scrutiny.
The per se approach would also be constitutionally impermissi-
ble under intermediate scrutiny because it punishes gay parents
solely for the status of being homosexual. In Robinson v. Califor-
nia, the Supreme Court held that punishing a narcotics addict for
the status of being an addict is cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the fourteenth amendment."' The Court reasoned
that laws could forbid conduct, such as the use of narcotics, but
could not inflict punishment for the status of addiction alone.'
An appellate court held that a gay parent's status as a homosex-
ual cannot be used to establish parental fitness since homosexual-
ity, like alcoholism, does not involve conduct when it is not prac-
ticed." 3 Having the status of being homosexual versus homosexual
conduct is a distinction that the courts have recognized in using
the middle ground approach.
B. The Middle Ground Approach
Under the middle ground approach, the parent's homosexuality
does not make him or her per se unfit, but the court usually re-
quires the parent to forego sexual activity with members of the
same sex, separate from a same-sex partner, or follow other re-
strictive behavioral guidelines before custody will be granted."14
This approach, unlike the per se approach, frowns only on homo-
sexual conduct and not on the mere status of being homosexual.
Thus, while all homosexuals are not presumed to be unfit parents,
110. Note, Quasi-Suspect Classes, supra note 24.
I11. 370 U.S. 663 (1962).
112. Id. at 660, 661.
113. Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 985, 31 Ohio App. 3d 171 (Ohio App. 1987).
114. Beargie, supra note 99, at 74.
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all sexually active homosexuals are presumed to be unfit parents.
Sexually active homosexual parents have the same difficult burden
to overcome as do all homosexual parents under the per se ap-
proach. They must disprove their unfitness. This burden is virtu-
ally impossible to overcome, because even with ample witnesses,
expert testimony, and other evidence to prove that the parent is fit
and that the child is happy and well-adjusted, the court will usu-
ally deny custody if the parent refuses to follow the court's guide-
lines. 115 Under this approach, the sexual behavior of the parent is
frequently scrutinized through inquiry with whom the gay parent
has sex, where sex occurs, where sexual acts occur, and how many
times sexual acts occur in a usual week.
116
An illustrative case using the middle ground approach is Collins
v. Collins."17 There, the father, rather than the lesbian mother,
was granted custody of the daughter. Further, in order to be
granted visitation, the mother was enjoined from having the child
around the mother's "lesbian friend" on an overnight basis."1 8 The
court stated that "[w]hile mother's homosexuality may be beyond
her control, submitting to it and living with a person of the same
sex in a sexual relationship is not. Just as an alcoholic overcomes
the habit and becomes a nondrinker, so this mother should at-
tempt to dissolve her alternative lifestyle of homosexual living.
Such is not too great a sacrifice to expect of a parent in order to
gain or retain custody of his or her child. This Court can take
judicial notice of the fact that throughout the ages, dedicated, lov-
ing parents have countless times made much greater sacrifices for
their children."' 1 9
In S.E.G. v. R.A.G., the Missouri Court of Appeals restricted
the visitation rights of a lesbian mother, requiring that the
mother's lover not have contact with the children. 20 The court
reasoned that the mother's lover "has chosen not to make her sex-
ual preference private but invites acknowledgment and imposes
her preference upon her children and her community. We are not
forbidding Wife from being a homosexual, from having a lesbian
relationship, or from attending gay activist or overt homosexual
outings. We are restricting her from exposing those elements of
115. N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. App. 1980).
116. J.P. v. P.W., 722 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. App. 1989) ("The gay parent and his ho-
mosexual lover, Harry Reed, lived in an apartment. They kiss and hold hands. They sleep
in the same bed. He and Reed perform oral sex on each other approximately once or twice
each week.").
117. WL 30137 (Tenn. App. 1988).
118. Id.
119. Id. (concurring opinion).
120. 735 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. App. 1987).
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her 'alternative life style' to her minor children. We fail to see
how these restrictions impose or restrict her equal protection or
privacy rights .. ."12 The cost to the mother for being a lesbian
was the loss of custody of her four children, the loss of the home
to the husband because he received custody of the children, and
restricted visitation privileges. 2'
Under intermediate scrutiny, the middle ground approach suf-
fers from the same flaws as the per se approach. The means used
are not substantially related to achieving the important govern-
mental objective of determining what is in the best interests of the
child. The courts' presumptions ignore the need for factual analy-
sis of the parties' parental capabilities and of the particular needs
of the child. This runs counter to the child's best interest. Thus,
the presumption of the gay parent's unfitness found in the middle
ground approach would be dissolved under equal protection inter-
mediate scrutiny.
C. The Nexus Approach
Under the nexus approach, the court requires proof that the
parent's homosexuality has or will adversely affect the child before
custody can be denied.' This approach is unique in that homo-
sexuals are not challenged from the outset with presumptions of
unfitness and are, therefore, on a more even footing with their het-
erosexual contestants. Neither the status of being homosexual nor
the conduct of the homosexual, absent adverse effects on the child,
are valid considerations when determining what is in the child's
best interest. 24
For example, in Marriage of Birdsall, the California Court of
Appeals overturned a trial court ruling prohibiting the gay father
from having any friend, acquaintance or associate known to be
homosexual in the presence of his son during his son's overnight
visitation. 2 5 The court held that a parent's sexual orientation
alone is not a proper basis for restricting visitation. 26 Rather, an
affirmative showing of harm or likely harm to the child is neces-
sary to restrict parental visitation.'27
In Conkel v. Conkel, the court also followed the nexus approach
in holding that the gay father could not be denied overnight visita-
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Bergie, supra note 4, at 74. See infra text accompanying notes 124-32.
124. Id.; see also S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985).
125. 197 Cal. App. 2d 1024, 243 Cal. Rptr 287 (1988).
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tion with his two sons on the basis of his homosexuality, absent
evidence that visitation would be harmful to the boys or that the
boys would be psychologically or physically harmed. 2 ' The court
stated that:
[t]oo long have courts labored under the notion that divorced
parents must somehow be perfect in every respect. The law
should recognize that parents, married or not, are individual
human beings each with his or her own particular virtues and
vices. The children of married parents are expected to take their
parents as they find them-as Oliver Cromwell said to his por-
traitist, 'with warts and all.' [Thus,] before depriving the sexu-
ally active parent of his crucial and fundamental right of contact
with his child, a court must find that the parent's conduct is
having, or is probably having, a harmful effect on the child.'29
In this case, there was no evidence that the children were ad-
versely affected by their father's homosexuality.
Most appellate courts dealing with heterosexual parents
cohabitating without marriage require some nexus between the
parent's behavior and harm to the child before custody will be
denied. 130 For example, in Jones v. Haraway, the mother sought
to restrict the child's overnight visits with the father because he
was living with his girlfriend out-of-wedlock.' 31 The court denied
the mother's requests for restricted visitation, reasoning that "cus-
tody will not be modified where the party seeking modification
fails to establish a substantial detrimental effect on the welfare of
the child as a result of the indiscreet conduct. In cases of primary
custody, indiscreet behavior, such as living with someone of the
opposite sex without the benefit of marriage, is only a factor to be
considered, and our case law requires that there be evidence
presented showing that such misconduct is detrimental to the
child.' 3 2 The same standards should be used in cases involving
gay parents with live-in lovers. A court should find that a parent's
conduct is having an adverse effect on the child before custody
can be denied, regardless of whether the parent is heterosexual or
gay.
Of the three approaches, the nexus approach is the only one
which meets the standards applied in intermediate scrutiny. Be-
128. Conkel, supra note 113, at 983.
129. Id.
130. Gallo v. Gallo, 184 Conn. 36, 440 A.2d 782 (1981); Chenevert v. Cheaevert,
497 So.2d 47 (La. Ct. App. 1986); J.L.P. v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);
Kelly v. Kelly, 217 N.J. Super. 147, 524 A.2d 1330 (Ch. Div. 1986); Venable v. Venable, 2
Va. App. 178, 342 S.E.2d 646 (1986); Brinkley v. Brinkley, I Va. App. 222, 336 S.E.2d
901 (1985).
131. 537 So. 2d 946 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988).
132. Id. at 947.
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cause the court, under this approach, actually analyzes the evi-
dence regarding the fitness of the parent and the particular needs
of the child, rather than bypassing these questions through pre-
sumptions, the best interests of the child can be more consistently
and accurately determined. Because the nexus approach is sub-
stantially related to the important governmental objective of pro-
tecting the best interests of the child, it is the only approach
which would endure an equal protection intermediate scrutiny
analysis.
To summarize, the presumptions of the gay parent's unfitness
used in both the per se and middle ground approaches ignore the
need for factual analysis of the parties' capabilities and of the par-
ticular needs of the child. Under these approaches, courts consist-
ently push aside evidence that the gay parent is fit and that the
child is not adversely affected by the parent's homosexuality, in
favor of presumptions that the gay parent's sexual orientation
must be harmful to the child. Both approaches inevitably deprive
deserving parents of custody while arbitrarily granting custody to
undeserving parents or third parties. Because these approaches
run counter to the governmental objective of protecting the child's
best interests, both approaches should fail intermediate scrutiny.
"An approach which allows litigants to fairly confront [the issue
of being a gay parent] and which allows courts to use complete
information instead of speculation .. .should be encouraged."' 33
That approach is the nexus approach, because it uses the facts of
each case to determine whether the gay parent is fit and whether
the child is adversely affected by the parent's homosexuality,
rather than presumptions. Thus, only the nexus approach is sub-
stantially related to the governmental objective of protecting the
best interests of the child.
Having established that two of the current approaches used by
courts to grant custody would not survive intermediate scrutiny,
this Comment will now examine, in Part III, the most common
reasons courts give for denying custody to the gay parent. These
reasons are used to support the presumptions found in the per se
and middle ground approaches.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE STATE'S REASONS USED TO SUPPORT
THE DENIAL OF CUSTODY TO GAY PARENTS
The court frequently advances five reasons for denying custody
to the gay parent. These reasons are used to support the presump-
tions of unfitness found in the per se approach and the middle
133. G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. App. 1987) (dissenting opinion).
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ground approach. First, courts believe that the child's morality
will be adversely affected by exposure to the parent's homosexual-
ity.134 Second, courts fear that the child will be forced to absorb
oppression, harassment and stigmatization caused by society's
negative view of homosexuality.13 Third, state sodomy statutes
forbid by definition many forms of homosexual sex; consequently,
many sexually active homosexuals are engaging in criminal behav-
ior. The court reasons that homosexuals, as criminals, are unfit
parents. 3 6 Fourth, courts fear that exposing the child to the gay
parent's homosexuality might condemn the child to sexual disori-
entation.37 Finally, courts fear that the child might contract
AIDS from the gay parent.'38 This section analyzes the logic of
these reasons and reveals that they would be insufficient to with-
stand equal protection intermediate scrutiny.
A. Gay Parent Adversely Affects Child's Morality
The most frequent reason given by courts for denying custody
to a gay parent is that the parent's homosexuality will adversely
affect the morality of the child. 39 An inference which must be
drawn from this conclusion is that the court believes homosexuals
themselves are inherently immoral. To use the words of a 1989
Missouri appellate custody case:
Private personal conduct by a parent which could well have an
effect on children during years in which their character, moral-
ity, virtues and values are being formed cannot be ignored or
sanctioned by courts. Private conduct of a parent in the presence
of a child or even under some other circumstances may well in-
fluence his or her young, impressionable life. . . .No matter
how [the gay parent] or society views the private morality of the
situation, we cannot ignore the influence [the gay parent's] con-
duct may well have upon the future of this chid and cannot give
our judicial cachet to such conduct by etching in the law-books
for all to read and follow. We see no salutary effect for the
young child by exposing him to the [gay parent's] miasmatic
moral standards.1
40
A 1988 Tennessee appellate court case expressed its opinion even
more succinctly: "Homosexuality has been considered contrary to
the morality of man for well over two thousand years. It has been
134. See infra text accompanying notes 139-57.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 158-75.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 176-82.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 183-88.
138. See infra text accompanying notes 189-91.
139. J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. App. 1989); Collins, supra note 61.
140. J.P., supra note 139.
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and is considered to be an unnatural, immoral act."''
Could laws which discriminate against homosexuals on the basis
of majoritarian morals be upheld if homosexuals were classified as
a quasi-suspect class? Gay litigants have argued that majoritarian
morals should not be the focus of lawmakers. 14 However, the
state can and does base laws on majoritarian moral values. 14 3 In
Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia sod-
omy statute, stating that the "presumed belief of a majority of the
electorate. . . that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unaccept-
able" was an adequate rationale to support the statute."14 Justice
Norris in Watkins, on the other hand, believed that majoritarian
morals cannot withstand an equal protection challenge: "[E]ven
accepting arguendo [the] proposition that anti-homosexual animus
is grounded in morality [as opposed to prejudice masking as mo-
rality], equal protection doctrine does not permit notions of
majoritarian morality to serve as compelling justification for laws
that discriminate against [protected] classes.' 45 The principle of
equal treatment, when imposed against majoritarian rule, arises
from the Constitution.
146
Some feuding heterosexual couples have even tried to use the
other parent's association with homosexuals as a ground for deny-
ing custody, claiming that the children's morality would be ad-
versely affected. In The Marriage of Walls, the father sought a
change of custody due to the mother's association with gay
men. 41 The father argued that the mother's association with gay
men would subject the children to an "unwholesome influence.' 4
Although the court denied the father's request to change custody,
it based its decision on the fact that there was no evidence that
the men with whom the mother associated were, indeed, gay, and
that the mother herself was not a lesbian. 49 The fact that the
court found it necessary to determine that the people involved
were not gay before allowing the mother to retain custody shows
its willingness to believe that gays may present an unwholesome
influence.
Another reason courts believe that gay parents will adversely
affect their children's morality is that they will teach them that
141. Collins, supra note 61.
142. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
143. Id.; see also Bowers, supra note 16.
144. Bowers, supra note 16, at 2846.
145. Watkins, supra note 51, at 1351.
146. Id. at 1341.
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being gay is not immoral. But a court cannot justify denial of cus-
tody because it believes the gay parent should indoctrinate the
child into sharing society's antipathy towards gays. 1 0 In Kallas v.
Kallas, the Supreme Court of Utah noted that the child of gay
parents may experience some conflict concerning basic life styles,
but stated that the assumption that it is better for a child to grow
up feeling antipathy towards gays than to experience any conflict
created in the child due to the parent's homosexuality contradicts
basic notions of tolerance critical to our pluralistic society. 151 Al-
though the court can forbid conduct it believes is immoral, the
first amendment forbids courts to outlaw beliefs. 52
Majoritarian morals were not considered important enough to
overshadow the rights of those in protected classes in Loving v.
Virginia.5 There, the presumed belief of the majority of the pub-
lic that interracial marriage is immoral was insufficient to uphold
antimiscegenation statutes. 54 The lower courts' view of morality
served merely as a mask for prejudice. The trial court stated in its
opinion that "almighty God had created the races different colors
and placed them on different continents. And but for the interfer-
ence with his arrangement, there would be no cause for such mar-
riages. The fact that God separated the races shows that he did
not intend for the races to mix.' 65 The Virginia Supreme Court,
which upheld the trial court, held that the state had a legitimate
purpose "to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens" and to pre-
vent "the corruption of blood," "a mongrel breed of citizens" and
"the obliteration of racial pride."' 56 Clearly, the court based its
decision on its own prejudice, and not on morality.
If gays were classified as a quasi-suspect class, legislators could
no longer rely on majoritarian morals when making laws which
classify on basis of sexual orientation. Courts could no longer use
a child to "punish or reward conduct a particular judge might
condemn or condone."' 5 7 Relying on majoritarian values, rather
than on a factual analysis of the parties' parental capabilities and
of the particular needs of the child, is irrational and counter-pro-
150. Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal Pro-
tection Analysis, 102 HARV. L. REV. 617-36 (1988).
151. 614 P.2d 641, 463 (Utah 1980).
152. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (distinguishing between govern-
ment control of conduct and regulation of speech); Note, Custody Denials, supra note 150;
see generally Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a
Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1285 (1985).
153. 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010 (1967).
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id. at 1.
156. Id.
157. Conkel, supra note 113.
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ductive in determining the best interests of the child. Because reli-
ance on majoritarian values is not substantially related to the im-
portant governmental objective of protecting the best interests of
the child, they should not be allowed as a basis to deny custody to
the gay parent under equal protection intermediate scrutiny.
B. Harassment and Stigmatization of Child Die to Parent's
Homosexuality
Having shown the negative reactions of people and courts to
gays based on majoritarian morals and prejudice, common sense
insists that some children of gay parents will be the target of har-
assment due to the parent's homosexuality. But courts do not usu-
ally deny custody to the gay parent because the facts have re-
vealed that the child has experienced specific incidents of
harassment. Rather, the court relies on the presumption that the
child has or will become a victim of societal prejudice and will,
therefore, be stigmatized.' 58 However, the dissenting opinion in a
1987 Missouri appellate case argued that "[t]o tip the scales
solely on the basis of what 'may' befall the child because of the
[gay parent's] sexual preference results in . . . the child's welfare
being made on less than complete information and renders it
suspect."' 59
According to Palmore v. Sidoti, denying custody because the
child might feel stigmatized by societal prejudice is constitution-
ally impermissible. 16 0 In Palmore, the Supreme Court held that
denial of custody because the child might be stigmatized by the
mother's interracial remarriage would violate the equal protection
clause, since a major purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to
do away with governmentally imposed discrimination. 161 The
Court recognized that "[t]here is a risk that a child living with a
stepparent of a different race may be subject to a variety of pres-
sures and stresses not [otherwise] present,"'6 2 but nevertheless
held that the denial of custody could not be based on "private
biases and the possible injury they might inflict.' 6 3 It noted, "the
Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tol-
erate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law,
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, given them effect."'"
158. S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. App. 1987); G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d
726 (Mo. App. 1987); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 314 N.W.2d 81 (N.D. 1981).
159. G.A., supra note 158, at 729.
160. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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By using potential stigmatization of the child as a reason for de-
nying custody to the gay parent, courts are giving allegiance to
societal prejudices, which is disallowed under equal protection.
Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court in Portage County Welfare
Dept. v. Summers approved the adoption of a black child by Cau-
casian petitioners over strenuous opposition by the Welfare De-
partment.'65 The court granted the adoption despite the belief of
the Welfare Department that the different racial backgrounds of
the parties would cause the child to be unable to blend into society
free from controversy and stigma.'6 As in Palmore, the court was
not allowed to deny custody based on the belief that the child
might be stigmatized by societal prejudice.
Palmore and Portage can easily be applied to custody disputes
involving gay parents. The potential stigmatization of children of
gay parents, like the children of interracial couples, is caused by
societal prejudice. Palmore stated that a potential stigmatization
of the child caused by societal prejudice cannot be used by courts
to deny custody.'6 7 Doing so violates the equal protection clause,
since the core purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to do
away with all governmentally imposed discrimination. 1 6 Thus, de-
nying custody to gay parents due to fear that the children will be
stigmatized by societal prejudice is unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court of Alaska applied the holding in Palmore in S.N.E. v.
R.L.B., a 1985 custody case involving a lesbian mother.' 69 The
court held that, when determining custody rights, "it is impermis-
sible to rely on any real or imagined social stigma attaching to
[the] Mother's status as a lesbian.11
1 71
Further, denying custody to the gay parent would not eliminate
the possibility of harassment of the child. A New Jersey appellate
court refused to change custody of the children from the gay fa-
ther to the mother based on potential stigmatization.' 7' The court
stated that changing custody would not remove the source of
stigma and potential embarrassment, 72 and that leaving the chil-
dren with their gay parent gave the children the beneficial effect
of overcoming "the constraints of currently popular sentiment or
prejudice."' 73 In a 1987 Ohio appellate custody case, the court
165. 38 Ohio S. Ct. 2d 144 (1974).
166. Id.
167. Palmore, supra note 160.
168. Id.
169. 699 P.2d 876 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1985).
170. Id. at 879.
171. M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 404 A.2d 1256 (1979).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 438.
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used the same logic when denying a mother's request to limit cus-
tody to the gay father based on the potential stigmatization of the
child, stating that the children would eventually have to come to
terms with their father's homosexuality regardless of how visita-
tion was structured. 17 4 Thus, potential stigmatization of the child
should not be used as a basis to deny custody to the gay parent. 175
C. Under Sodomy Statutes, Gays are Criminals and,
Therefore, Unfit Parents
Another reason frequently used by courts to deny custody to the
gay parent is because many sexually active gays are engaging in
criminal behavior under sodomy statutes.17 6 In Bowers v. Hard-
wick, the Supreme Court upheld the rights of states to enforce
sodomy statutes as applied to homosexuals, stating that the due
process clause provides no substantive privacy protection for acts
of private homosexual sodomy. 7 Because sodomy statutes
criminalize most gay sexual activity, courts in custody disputes
have denied custody to gay parents on the basis of their criminal
behavior.' 7 1 The court reasons that the parent is unfit because he
or she is a criminal. This argument is without merit.
Firstly, sodomy statute do not make criminals out of all homo-
sexuals. As the court in High Tech Gays stated:
[H]omosexual sodomy is not a crime in over half the states. It
appears that people who engage in private consensual sodomy
rarely if ever face actual prosecution today. In fact, the state of
Georgia never even presented a criminal charge to the grand
jury against plaintiff in Hardwick [citation omitted]. Justice
Powell in his concurrence in Hardwick, noting that there was no
reported decision involving prosecution under the Georgia stat-
ute for several decades, suggested that actual prosecution and
imprisonment of plaintiff may violate the eighth amendment. He
described laws proscribing private consensual sodomy as having
'a history of nonenforcement' that suggests the 'moribund char-
acter' of such laws today [citations omitted] .1
Further, not all homosexual behavior is outlawed. 80 Since
174. Conkel, supra note 113, at 987.
175. Id.
176. Sodomy statutes forbid contact between the genitals of one person and the
mouth or anus of another, and are currently in force in twenty-four states and the District
of Columbia. These statutes prohibit many forms of sexual activity in which gays can en-
gage, even if the acts occur between consenting adults in the privacy of the home.
177. 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1986).
178. Constant A. v. Paul A., 344 Pa. Super 49, 57, 496 A.2d 1, 5 (1985); Roe v.
Roe, 228 Va. 727, 324 S.E.2d 694 (1985); Chaffin v. Frye, 45 Cal. App. 2d 39, 47, 119
Cal. Rptr. 22, 26 (Ct. App. 1975).
179. High Tech Gays, supra note 44, at 1373.
180. See id. at 1374: "[A]II but four of the states that continue to outlaw homosex-
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fewer than half the states have sodomy statutes, and since most
sodomy statutes do not prohibit many types of sex in which homo-
sexuals can engage, most gays are not engaging in criminal behav-
ior under sodomy statutes.
However, courts assume that the gay parent has engaged in
prohibited sexual conduct, when, in fact, many gay people do not
engage in sodomy. A growing number of gay men, in an effort to
reduce the spread of the HIV virus (which is thought to cause
AIDS), do not engage in sodomy.'"' Further, "eighteen of the
twenty-four states and the District of Columbia that continue to
proscribe sodomy, proscribe it for both homosexuals and heter-
osexuals. Consequently, if engaging in private consensual sodomy
indicates lack of willingness to uphold public law, heterosexuals'
willingness to uphold public law appears equally to be called into
question.' 82 If the court is going to presume illegal sexual activ-
ity, it must make that presumption for heterosexuals too, and
must subject both heterosexuals and gays to fact-gathering on the
issue.
"Finally, the fact that a person lacks respect for one law does
not imply that he or she lacks respect for laws in general. The
argument that persons who 'behave improperly in one regard are
likely to transgress in others . . . is both a logical nonsequitur and
a psychological error."' 83
In summary, it is incorrect for courts to assume that all gays
are criminals under sodomy statutes. Over half the states do not
have sodomy statutes. Further, most sodomy statutes do not pro-
hibit many types of sexual activity in which gays can engage.
Even if a gay parent does engage in sodomy, denying custody to
the parent on that basis is not in the best interests of the child,
because a fit parent who engages in sodomy could be denied cus-
tody on that basis in favor of a less-fit parent or third party. In
order to determine the best interests of the child, those factors
which affect the child should be considered above those which do
not. Thus, presuming that a gay parent engages in criminal be-
havior under sodomy statutes, and denying custody on that basis,
is not substantially related to the governmental objective of deter-
mining the best interests of the child. Under intermediate scru-
tiny, even if the parent did engage in sodomy, the court would still
have to show that this had an adverse effect on the child before
ual activity only outlaw acts involving the sexual organs of one person and the mouth or
anus of another, not all sorts of other homosexual activity..."
181. Martin, The Impact of AIDS on Gay Male Sexual Behavior Patterns in New
York City, 77 ANs J. PuB. HEALTH 578, 580 (1987).
182, High Tech Gays, supra note 44, at 1374.
183. Id. (citing Rosenblum, Moral Character, 27 STAN. L. REV. 925 (1975)).
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denying custody to the gay parent. Assuming that the sexual ac-
tivities were done in private and not in view of the child, it is
difficult to imagine how a child could be adversely affected if his
or her parent were engaging in sodomy rather than in other sexual
acts, such as manual stimulation, which are not prohibited.
D. Exposing Child to Gay Parent's Homosexuality Might
Make Child Gay
Another reason frequently given by the .state for denying cus-
tody to the gay parent is that exposure to the gay parent's homo-
sexuality will make the child gay.184 Homosexuality is viewed as a
learned behavior. For example, in a 1988 Tennessee appellate
case, the court gave weight to expert testimony which stated that
"there is disagreement as to whether homosexuality is a learned
behavior or is genetically determined, that [the expert] is of the
opinion it is a learned process more than a genetic process, and
that the learning continues past the age of nine."' 85 In another
1988 Tennessee appellate case, the court stated that "it is unac-
ceptable to subject children to any course of conduct that might
influence them to develop homosexual traits, and the facts of this
case indicate that there is a strong possibility, because [the
mother and her lesbian lover live together], the children would be
subjected to such influences."' 86
This belief runs contrary to scientific evidence which shows that
children raised by homosexual parents are no more likely to be-
come homosexual than are children raised by heterosexual par-
ents. 87 The fact that a great majority of homosexuals had hetero-
sexual parents is a further indication that sexual orientation is not
learned from the parent. In Conkel, the court rejected the
mother's argument that contact with the children's gay father
might trigger homosexual tendencies in the two boys, stating that
there was a substantial consensus among experts that being raised
by a homosexual parent does not increase the likelihood that a
child will become homosexual. 8 8 The court relied on numerous
studies, as well as the opinion of an expert in gender identity in
184. Collins v. Collins, WL 30173 (Tenn. App. 1988); Black v. Black, WL 22823
(Tenn. App. 1988).
185. Collins, supra note 185.
186. Black, supra note 184.
187. S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. App. 1987) (citing following articles:
Herrington, Children of Lesbians, Developmentally Typical, Psychiatric News, Oct. 19,
1979, at 23; R. Green, The Best Interests of the Child with a Lesbian Mother, Bulletin of
AA PL, Vol. 10, Nov. 1, 1982, at 7-15); see generally Note, Sexual Identity of 37 Chil-
dren Raised by Homosexual Parents, 135 AM~l. J. PSYCHIATRY 692 (1978).
188. Conkel, supra note 113, at 986.
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children, who said that "no theory in the developmental psychol-
ogy literature suggests that having homosexual parents leads to a
homosexual outcome."1 89
Relying on the presumption that gay parents make their chil-
dren gay, as with all the reasons in Part III advanced by courts to
deny custody to the gay parent, runs counter to the best interests
of the child. The court, once again, is relying on an unsupported
presumption, rather than on a factual analysis of the parental ca-
pabilities and of the particular needs of the child. Thus, this rea-
son would fail under equal protection intermediate scrutiny, since
it is not substantially related to the important governmental objec-
tive of determining the best interests of the child.
E. Child Will Contract AIDS
AIDS, an acronym for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome,
is being used more and more frequently in custody and visitation
disputes to deny custody to a gay parent.'90 Because those infected
with the HIV virus in the United States are predominantly male
homosexuals, the issue of contracting AIDS will probably be
found more and more in custody cases involving gay males. To
date, most cases to change custody or deny visitation solely on the
parent's possible or actual infection with the HIV virus have been
unsuccessful. 91 Courts have relied on the large body of medical
evidence which finds that AIDS is not transmitted through casual
contact.19 2 Thus, an equal protection challenge has not yet been
necessary to dissolve this reason as a basis to deny custody to the
gay parent. It is mentioned in this Comment primarily as a warn-
ing that fear of the child getting AIDS from the gay parent will
be used with increasing frequency in the future, and that gay par-
ents, especially males, should be prepared to defend against it in
custody battles.
This Comment has examined the five reasons frequently given
by courts to deny custody to gay parents. These reasons are used
to support the presumption of unfitness of the gay parent found in
the per se and middle ground approaches. Under intermediate
scrutiny, neither majoritarian morals, a perceived risk of possible
future stigmatization of the child, the presumed criminal status of
189. Id. (quoting Dr. Richard Green, Professor of Psychiatry, State University of
New York at Stony Brook) (citing Green, Best Interests, supra note 187, at 9).
190. Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 139 Misc. 2d 209, 56 U.S.L.W. 2587 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1988); Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956, 56 U.S.L.W. 2646 (Ind. App. 1988);
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the gay parent due to the parents homosexuality, an unsupported
belief that gay parents make their children gay, nor fear of expos-
ing the child to the AIDS virus would be sufficient reasons for
denying custody to the gay parent, without affirmative proof of an
actual adverse effect on the child. A factual analysis of each case,
including a factual determination of the parties' parental capabili-
ties and of the particular needs of the child, rather than reliance
on presumptions, is necessary to determine the best interests of
the child. Thus, the use of these reasons as a basis for denying
custody would fail equal protection intermediate scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
The odds are currently heavily skewed against gay parents in
custody disputes. If gays were classified as a quasi-suspect class,
the rights of homosexual and heterosexual parents would be more
equal. Homosexuals deserve to be classified as a quasi-suspect
class because they meet the four criteria determined by the Su-
preme Court to justify such a classification. Homosexuality is im-
mutable and unchangeable. Gays are the target of incorrect ste-
reotypes. Gays have faced a history of discrimination and
stigmatization. Gays are a politically powerless minority with very
little representation in government.
Under intermediate scrutiny, the per se approach and the mid-
dle ground approach would fail an equal protection challenge.
Under the per se and middle ground approaches, the courts' pre-
sumptions sidestep the need for factual analysis of the parties' pa-
rental capabilities and of the particular needs of the children.
Both approaches inevitably deprive deserving parents of custody,
while arbitrarily granting custody to some undeserving parents or
third parties. Because these approaches run counter to the govern-
mental objective of protecting the child's best interest, both should
fail intermediate scrutiny. Only the nexus approach does away
with presumptions of the gay parent's unfitness and requires proof
that the parent's homosexuality has or will adversely affect the
child before custody can be denied. Because the court under this
approach chooses to analyze the evidence, rather than bypassing
these questions with presumptions, it is the only approach which is
substantially related to the governmental objective of protecting
the best interests of the child and thus the only approach which
can withstand intermediate scrutiny.
The five reasons used by courts for denying custody to gay par-
ents support the presumptions of unfitness of gay parents used in
the per se and middle ground middle approaches. Under interme-
diate scrutiny, neither majoritarian morals, a perceived risk of
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possible future stigmatization to the child, the presumed criminal
status of the gay parent due to his or her homosexuality, an un-
supported belief that gay parents make their children gay, nor
fear of exposing the child to the AIDS virus would be sufficient
reasons for denying custody to the gay parent without affirmative
proof of an actual adverse effect on the child. The best interests of
the child are met by using tests of parental fitness which do not
rely on biased presumptions.
Not only does the gay parent suffer when custody is denied
solely due to that parent's sexual orientation, but the child of the
gay parent suffers as well. "The need of a child for visitation with
a separated parent is a natural right of the child, and is as worthy
of protection as is the parent's rights of visitation with the child;
thus, [unfair denial of visitation] is an infringement of the child's
right to receive the love, affection, training, and companionship of
the parent." 19 3
This Comment only addresses the irrationality of laws which
deny gay parents custody of their children, and how both gay par-
ents and the interests of their children would be better served
were laws which classify on the basis of sexual orientation submit-
ted to intermediate scrutiny. It should be noted that a quasi-sus-
pect classification would further serve to protect homosexuals
against the private and official discrimination they encounter in
virtually all other areas.
David S. Dooley*
193. Conkel, supra note 113, at 983.
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